Given below are two statements:

Statement I: The jar does not exist' is common to all kinds of non-existence.

Statement II: The jar will exist' refers to previous non-existence.

In the light of the above statements, choose the correct answer from the options given below

The correct answer is Both Statement I and Statement II are true.

This question is rooted in the classical Indian philosophical tradition — particularly the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school — which provides a systematic and detailed analysis of Abhāva (non-existence or negation). To understand why both statements are true, we must first understand the four classical types of non-existence recognized in this tradition.

The Four Types of Abhāva (Non-Existence):

1. Prāgabhāva (Prior/Previous Non-existence): The non-existence of a thing before it comes into being. For example, before a potter makes a jar, the jar has "prior non-existence."

2. Pradhvaṃsābhāva (Posterior Non-existence): The non-existence of a thing after it is destroyed. Once a jar is broken, it ceases to exist — this is its "posterior non-existence."

3. Atyantābhāva (Absolute Non-existence): The total and permanent non-existence of something that never was and never will be — e.g., "a sky-flower" (an impossible object).

4. Anyonyābhāva (Mutual Non-existence): The difference or distinctness between two things — e.g., "a jar is not a cloth," meaning the jar has the mutual non-existence of a cloth.

Evaluating Statement I: "The jar does not exist" is common to all kinds of non-existence.

The statement "The jar does not exist" is a simple, present-tense declarative sentence about the non-existence of a jar. Crucially, this phrasing is neutral and generic �� it does not by itself specify why or in what manner the jar does not exist. Consider how each type of non-existence can make this statement true:

- Prāgabhāva: The jar does not exist yet (it has not been created). → "The jar does not exist" ✓
- Pradhvaṃsābhāva: The jar has been destroyed and no longer exists. → "The jar does not exist" ✓
- Atyantābhāva: The jar can never exist (an impossible jar). → "The jar does not exist" ✓
- Anyonyābhāva: What is here (say, a cloth) is not the jar. → "The jar does not exist" (here) ✓

Thus, the simple expression "The jar does not exist" applies universally as a surface-level description across all four types of non-existence. It is the most general, undifferentiated statement of absence. Statement I is therefore TRUE.

Evaluating Statement II: "The jar will exist" refers to previous non-existence.

The statement "The jar will exist" is a future-tense assertion — it says the jar does not currently exist but will come into being. This is the defining characteristic of Prāgabhāva (Prior/Previous Non-existence).

Prāgabhāva is specifically defined as the non-existence of an effect before its cause produces it. The jar, before the potter crafts it from clay, is said to have Prāgabhāva. The very implication of saying "the jar will exist" is that:

- Right now, the jar is absent (it has not yet been made).
- It has a future — meaning it is producible and will come into being.
- This kind of absence — one that precedes a future creation — is precisely Prāgabhāva (previous/prior non-existence).

Note the contrast with the other types: Posterior non-existence (Pradhvaṃsābhāva) would correspond to "the jar was" (it existed and is now gone). Absolute non-existence would mean it can never exist at all — which contradicts the claim "it will exist." Mutual non-existence refers to distinctness, not temporal absence. Only Prāgabhāva is consistent with the future-tense claim of coming-into-existence. Statement II is therefore TRUE.

Conclusion:

Both statements correctly reflect the philosophical analysis of non-existence in Indian logic:
- Statement I is true because the general expression "the jar does not exist" is a blanket statement applicable to all four forms of Abhāva.
- Statement II is true because "the jar will exist" specifically and precisely corresponds to Prāgabhāva — the prior/previous non-existence that precedes a thing's creation.

Therefore, the correct answer is "Both Statement I and Statement II are true."